Ex?post Evaluation and Sectoral Policy, with particular reference to Dairy Development in Nigeria by Wilson, Frank A.
Ex-post Evaluation and Sectoral Policy, with particular
reference to Dairy Development in Nigeria
Frank A. Wilson
increased interest recently in improving and
refining development project planning and manage-
ment practice has also stimulated greater interest
in the methods and procedures of ex-post
evaluation. The IBRD has, for example, recog-
nised this not only in commissioning Urna Lele's
valuable study of World Bank assisted projects
(Lele 1975) but also by encouraging borrowing
countries (and others) to incorpora te evaluation
units into project development and management
teams (Willoughby 1977). The British Ministry
of Overseas Development has also recognised the
need for formalised evaluation studies and has
effibarked upon a programme of work utiising
university staff. Some writers who have evaluated
on-going schemes and projects have questioned the
extent to which further refinements of appraisal
methodology, and especially those concentrated
on social cost-benefit analysis applications, are
justified, and argue that scarce planning resources
could be better employed in other areas
(Carruthers and Clayton 1977; Desai 1977;
Rondinelli 1976). Although the writer shares this
view, it is increasingly necessary to look for
constructive ways of suggesting how the emphasis
should be shifted.
It is not difficult to find examples of projects
where problems of 'implementation' are cited.
Implementation is, however, a portmanteau word
which can mean different things to different
peopleand is often required to do so. An imple-
mentation problem can be said to occur when
some activity has not taken place as planned and!
or has not achieved the purpose for which it was
carried out. Within this loose definition we can
incorporate a whole range of performance
indicators, from adverse technical input-output
relationships to overspending of budgeted funds.
Such is the complex and dynamic nature of devel-
opment projects, however, that the real nature of
the implementation problem may not be readily
or easily apparent. To what extent is a lower than
planned level of technical performance caused by
ineffective day-to-day management or late delivery
of inputs due to a cumbersome ordering and
accounts system? To what extent are both causes
secondary to faulty initial planning which based
technical performance levels on over-optimistic
assumptions? Different projects throw up different
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implementation problems, but attempts to solve
them have a common operational significance.
Principally this entails a distinction between
improving in-built monitoring and control pro-
cedures as part of the overall project management
function, and ex-post evaluation as an aid to
sector policy formulation and a device for
improving programme management (Turner
1976).
Although there may appear to be no clear
demarcation line between monitoring and control
and ex-post evaluation, it has to be remembered
that a predominant feature of public sector project
planning is the nature of the planning and imple-
mentation machinery within which projects fit.
Whereas the private entrepreneur may identify,
prepare and appraise his own projects and then
proceed to manage and evaluate them himself-
or through a management teamthe public sector
project may be identified and prepared by one
department, appraised by another, managed by
a newly created management agency, and evalu-
ated by another department which may or may
not have been involved in the initial planning of
the scheme. Thus the separateness of those parts
of the government machine responsible for these
different planning and management activities is
an integral part of public sector planning. There
are ways in which systems could be rationalized
to reduce the number of links and improve com-
munication between those that remain, but a
partial (at best) acceptance of the structure
appears necessary. This understanding and accept-
ance requires an awareness of the limited amount
of direct feedback from the on-going project to
those who may be required to identify and
appraise new ones in the same sectoral or sub-
sectoral area.
For ptblic sector projects, planned and recognised
ex-post evaluation procedures would thus appear
to be necessary. In the contrasting situation of the
individual entrepreneur, ex-post evaluation is an
automatic reassessment which may not even be
committed to paper, and the feedback mechanism
is a direct one, whereas in many public sectors,
large and small, it is essentially indirect,
Recent advisory work to assist in carrying out ex-
post evaluation studies of projects in the livestock
sector of Nigeria gave the writer the opportunity
to examine the role of such studies in the formu-
latio'n of new project initiatives and in reviewing
sectoral policy. The commissioned studies' were
also expected to include specific recommendations
for the improvement of the projects concerned.
The terms of reference were almost identical for
the five projects examined:2
to evaluate the technical and economic feasi-
bili'ty of the projects and make recommendations
for future planning and the improvement of
the existing schemes.
The technical evaluation, carried out in the main
by Nigerian university staff, concentrated upon
animal production, health, research (where appro-
priate), processing and technical management. The
economic evaluation, carried out in the main by
the writer, was concerned with assessing com-
mercial and financial viablity, relating this to the
broader objectives of the projects and sectoral
policy and then assessing their impact as a guide
to future planning.
The Maiduguri dairy project
Following in part the recommendations of FAON,
the Nigerian Government has in recent years
placed some emphasis on increasing the share of
marketed milk from local production as opposed
to that (major) portion coming from imports of
tinned milk, milk powder and dairy products.
This was reflected in the projects and schemes
included in the Federal and State 1975-80 Devel-
opment Plans and has more recently been intensi-
fied under the 'Operation Feed the Nation' (OFN)
campaign. The underlying philosophy of OFN
is an increased degree of self-reliance in food
production, although the major initiatives so far
have come in crop rather than livestock areas.
The Maiduguri Dairy study provides a good
example of the problems for the analyst inherent
in this type of project. At the same time it
demonstrates in a direct way the extent to which
the planning and execution of such projects is
handicapped by the lack of any consistent policy
framework.
Maiduguri is situated in the North-East of Nigeria
and is the capital of what is now Borno State.
1 Federal Livestock Department, Dairy, Beef and Vaccine Project Ex..
post Evaluation Report, Government Printer, Kaduna March 1976.
2 Maiduguri Dairy, Maiduguri, Borno State;
Vom Dairy Farm, Federal Department of Veterinary Research,
Vom, Plateau State;
Obudu Cattle Ranch Development Corporation, Cross River State;
Agege Dairy, Agege, Lagos State;
Vaccine Production Scheme, Federal Department of Veterinary
Research, Vom, Plateau State.
3 FAO International Scheme for Co-ordination of Dairy Development-
Nigeria Report, Rome, September 1975.
The milk receiving and pasteurisation plant was
commissioned in 1973 after 'a long period of
assessment and re-assessment first begun in 1963
by the then Northern Regional Government. No
recognisa;ble project document was produced, but
the declared objectives of the scheme were that
it should function as a processing and marketing
intermediary for local producers and as a source
of hygenic milk and milk products for the people
of Maiduguri.
There were therefore three sets of objectives:
Local Welfareimproved consumption through
clean milk and hygienic milk products;
Productionincreased local supplies;
Developmentestablishing regular markets for
local cattle keepers.
Before assessing how the project as evaluated
satisfied these objectives it is helpful to consider
the governmental framewoik within which the
scheme operated. It should be noted that there was
no declared policy on the extent to which the
project should be profitable or operate on a break-
even basis, or whether a continuing financial
deficit was acceptable. One special feature of
commercially based projects of this kind, operated
from within the public sector, is that they become
absorbed into the ongoing structure of depart-
mental government administration. This has the
effect or masking financial performance by means
of adherence to established accounting procedures
and encourages officials to beg the question as to
whether viabilityor some recognised limit on
financial subsidyshould 'be sought af'ter. At the
time of the evaluation in January and February,
1976, the project was operated by the State
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Management was under the direct control of a
Senior Livestock Officer and financial provision
was through a departmental recurrent vote item.
All revenue was paid in'to the Government
Treasury and was not used by the project to meet
direct expenses. All staff other than occasional
casual workers were on the permanent establish-
ment of the Agricultural Department. All vehicles
were Departmental 'pool' vehicles and their
specific allocation to the project was limited.
The welfare objective was achieved only to a very
limited degree. Some value could be attached to
the provision of hygienic uncontaminated milk
rather than the untreated and often unclean
product sold locally. The share of the total market
taken by the dairy was, however, relatively small.
it was also apparent that those purchasing
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pasteurised milk and nono (yoghurt) were pre-
dominantly from middle and higher income
groups who iubstituted the 'improved' local
products for imported tinned liquid and powdered
milk. The consumer welfare objective could not
be looked at only in public health terms, and,
as will be shown below, the plant was not able
effectively to enter the lower income urban market
due mainly to a grossly inadequate supply
pattern. Nutritionally the need4 was for a higher
per capita consumption and improved distribution
of total animal protein. In terms of filling a
nutritional gap it mattered little whether this was
met from locally produced liquid milk, imported
dried milk, or a combination of the two. If
nutritional targets were to be reached, the only way
that this could be achieved in the short and
medium term was through a large increase year by
year in the importation of milk and milk products.
The extent of the achievement of the self-reliance
or production objective could not, then, be con-
sidered in isolation from the welfare objective. In
the case of the Maiduguri Dairy Project it was
difficult to ascertain the level of incremental pro-
duction as a result of the scheme. The raw milk
collection service had undoubtedly provided a
more organised marketing system than that which
was, and is, operated by many local milk and
nono traders. The dairy plant paid marginally
better prices and provided a direct cash payment.
It appeared likely that, from the producers' point
of view, these advantages more than compensated
for the more stringent quality standards required,
and that in consequence there was a considerable
diversion of supply from traditional trading
channels, and only a small increment in supply
due to 'the project itself.
It has already been noted that one purpose of the
evaluation was to enable relevant recommenda-
tions to be made about dairy development policy
during the Third Plan period. The (then) North-
Eastern State Government had allocated 19 per
cent of total livestock projects, capital expenditure
to dairy schemes, including the establishment of
14 units modelled on the Maiduguri plant5. The
objective behind locating the units in different
parts of the State appeared predominantly pro-
duction oriented, particularly as provision had
been made for each pasteurisation unit to be
4 FAO estimated that in 1972 the total consumption of cows' milk and
milk products was equivalent to 110 kg. per caput as against a
nutritionally desirable level of 220 kg. per caput.
5 North-Eastern State Third National Development Plan 1975-80
Public Sector Programmes, Military Governor's Office, Maiduguri,
1975.
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complemented by the establishment of a govern-
ment-run dairy farm. This was a clear recognition
that, as the financial analysis of the Maiduguri
plant demonstrated, local supply from individual
cattle keepers was insufficient to maintain a
commercially viable level of throughput with the
technology adopted. But the technical constraints
on large-scale commercial dairying in Nigeria are
such that milk production units of the type
planned are unlikely to be commercially viable.
Production on this scale would, therefore, have to
be underwritten by the State or Federal Govern-
ment over a considerable number of years, and
possibly indefinitely. A very high premium would
have to put on net foreign exchange savings and
the small amount of employment created in order
to justify such initiatives in social cost-benefit
terms.
On the other hand the Maiduguri project had
clearly gone some way towards meeting recognis-
able developmental objectives at the level of the
individual citizen. Over the life-time of the project,
in excess of 65 per cent (on average) of milk
supplied had come from small settled and semi-
settled cattle keepers for whom the establishment
of a regular market outlet was likely to he of
considerable significance. Of equal importance was
the opportunity which regular contact with pro-
ducers gave for the provision of technical advice,
supplementary feeds, improved bulls, milk quality
improvement, and animal health checks. In the
nomenclature of project appraisal these benefits
may be categorised as externalities, particularly
as they were not recognised at the planning stage
and have received little recognition since the
project began. They help to highlight the distinc-
tion between 'production' and 'development' and
demonstrate that one does not necessarily follow
from the other. In this case, as indicated above,
the direct production orientation of planners was
unlikely to 'bring with it the low-level small-scale
development which deprived rural areas so
desperately need.
The Maiduguri project evaluation, described here
briefly and selectively, appears to demonstrate
the way in which those responsible for ex-post
studies can not only seek to improve existing
projects and advise specifically on the planning
of new ventures but also throw valuable light
on the underlying policy issues. The methodology
of such studies is relatively unsophisticated and
the work involved is often tedious and unattractive.
However, if we are to learn more about the real
reasons for the success or failure of our planning
efforts, this kind of work, consistently applied,
must increasingly be carried out.
